Reading Article
Sanctions Won’t Stop North Korea’s Nukes
Stephan Haggard – Over the last two years the Bush administration has had surprising success putting together a sanctions regime against North Korea. But the country’s threat to test a nuclear weapon could leave the U.S. worse off than ever: with a nuclear North Korea perfectly willing to pay the price of hunger and even famine. I’ll tell you first why these sanctions are so efficient, and then why they’re also ineffective.
First, how did the U.S., which trades hardly at all with North Korea, gain such influence over Pyongyang’s international economic relations? Using provisions of the Patriot Act, the Bush administration issued a warning in 2005 that a small Macau bank, Banco Delta Asia, was involved in money-laundering activities. Facing a run on the bank, the Chinese authorities moved swiftly to take it over and close out the North Korean accounts. Some of these were almost certainly funds used by North Korea’s military and political leadership. Financial institutions, even small ones, learned that they did business with North Korea at their own risk.
The executive order of 2005, “Blocking Property of Weapons of Mass Destruction Proliferators and Their Supporters,” issued a similar warning shot to financial institutions. The U.S. subsequently interpreted “supporters” liberally to include those doing business with firms suspected of WMD activities, even if the trade in question was not WMD-related.
Japan has moved toward a hard sanctions approach. Europe stands on the sidelines waiting for the dust to clear. So China and South Korea have become Pyongyang’s economic lifelines. North Korea is more dependent on them than ever before.
But in the wake of the July 4 missile launch, China surprised observers by accepting a strong Security Council resolution that called for sanctions against proliferation activities. The biggest surprise then came from South Korea, which, prior to the missile launch, warned that it would discontinue humanitarian assistance if a missile went into the air. South Korean sanctions now loom large on the economic landscape of the peninsula. Some history explains why.
In the 1990s, the North Korean economy collapsed as the Russians traded decades of largesse for hard currency terms. Up to a million people died in one of the greatest famines of the 20th century. But grain production today remains below its 1990 level and food shortages have persisted. A bumper harvest last year, and food aid from South Korea and China, created the illusion of a return to normalcy. But recent floods show the ongoing vulnerability of the North Korean economy.
North Korea needs over 6 million tons of grain to feed its population — and even that on minimal rations. One million tons of that demand is met by imports and aid, over 85 percent of which is supplied by China and South Korea. If Seoul sticks to its guns, food shortages will certainly recur.
While sanctions have hit the regime hard, they have also had the perverse effect of strengthening those most opposed to a negotiated settlement. Sanctions will not achieve regime change. Kim Jong Il has demonstrated his ability to weather famine. In fact, sanctions will likely lead directly to the test, which will then scuttle the Six Party Talks for the remainder of the Bush administration, and lead directly to a new humanitarian crisis.
It is probably too late for the U.S. to make a face-saving gesture. But we must learn two lessons from the North Korean case. First, sanctions do not necessarily work against authoritarian regimes willing to allow massive human suffering. And second, ambiguous signals about the willingness to negotiate are unlikely to produce the type of settlement America needs.
Source : http://blog.washingtonpost.com/postglobal